Could I have done otherwise?
On the axis: Freedom of the will · a choice
A man admits to an offence, but his history and his brain pushed him to it: could he really have acted otherwise, and if not, is he responsible for it?
You are a juror. The man seated before the court has committed an offence, and he admits it. But his lawyer pleads: a violent childhood, and an impulsiveness doctors trace to his brain, led him there; deep down, he says, his client could not have acted otherwise. The prosecutor replies that each of us, with our history and our leanings, is nonetheless answerable for our acts. The presiding judge turns to you. What weighs more, in your own mind?
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Justification
The analysis of voluntary action and of (prohairesis) presupposes that the origin of action is in us: we are responsible for our acts, of which we are the origin, which grounds praise, blame and punishment. This defence of self-mastery leans toward , without thematizing modern .
Nicomachean Ethics, III.1-5
Justification
Distributive justice follows a proportional (geometric) equality: goods and honours are apportioned according to each person's merit, not in equal shares. Refusing arithmetical equality in favour of proportion to merit inclines moderately toward the meritocratic pole, without absolutizing property.
Nicomachean Ethics, V.3 (1131a); Politics, III.9
Anchors: Aristotle · van Inwagen
leads to: The meaning of punishment · Distributive justice (Desert or natural lottery?)