Without the power to choose otherwise, I would be responsible for nothing.

Supports

When I deliberate, I treat several courses of action as open: I weigh reasons precisely because I believe the outcome is not yet settled.
But holding someone responsible, praising or blaming them, presupposes that they could have than they did.
Yet we hold that responsibility to be real, in law as in morals; we must therefore grant it its condition, a power to choose otherwise.

Therefore We therefore have , the condition of moral responsibility.

How far does this reasoning convince you?

Not at all

Entirely

Deepenings

Why does responsibility require the power to act otherwise?

If only one outcome were possible, blaming an agent for their act would be like blaming a clock for striking: blame addresses an agent only where an alternative was open to them.
This is why the law excuses those who acted under absolute constraint: no one is held responsible for what they could not avoid.

How far does this reasoning convince you?

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Entirely

Kant's formula: "you ought, therefore you can"

reverses the order: it is not freedom that is proved first, it is moral duty that attests to it.
If a moral demand genuinely binds me, it presupposes me able to meet it: the "you ought" implies the "you can", hence a free will.

How far does this reasoning convince you?

Not at all

Entirely

Put to the test

Problems