The lottery of merit
On the axis: Moral responsibility · the part of luck in merit
Two identical reckless drivers, a child crosses in front of only one: chance makes one a killer and the other lucky. And what we praise, talents, character, was no more chosen: if luck pervades everything, what remains of merit properly one's own?
Two reckless drivers behave exactly alike, each as careless as the other. In front of one only, a child crosses: he runs the child over. The other drives home none the wiser.
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Justification
The third antinomy sets a seamless against the demand for a free causality, and both theses seem equally provable. Kant resolves it through the distinction: determinism governs the human being as phenomenon, yet nothing forbids thinking him a cause at the noumenal level. The moral law requires it: "you ought" implies "you can", so freedom is a fact of practical reason. Hence the explicit rejection of (a wretched subterfuge); but since freedom stays noumenal, never observed in the world, the score stops short of the extreme.
Critique of Pure Reason, Third Antinomy · Critique of Practical Reason
Justification
Kant refuses to let a government impose its conception of happiness on citizens: a paternalistic power would be "the greatest despotism". Yet he does not reduce the state to protecting holdings acquired outside any public condition, since mine and thine become conclusive only in the civil state. He thus authorises taxing the propertied to support those who cannot provide for themselves, for the sake of the people's own preservation. This is redistribution as relief: it aims neither at equal fortunes nor at offsetting inequalities of birth and talent.
Doctrine of Right, §41-49 and General Remark C · On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, II
leads to: Freedom of the will · Distributive justice (Desert or natural lottery?)