Relation to others· Bondsnamed middle

Concentric circles

Axis: Partiality — Is it right to give moral priority to those close to us?

Our concern for others spreads out in circles: intense for those close to us, it reaches, fading as it goes, all the way to strangers. Far from contradicting impartiality, this priority given to our own can follow from it: it is with them that we know and can do the most, and a world where each tends first to their own takes better care of everyone. The moral task is not to abolish these circles but to widen outward the care we feel within.

Who holds this position

Philosophers 1

Show inferred positions (1)

Marcus Aureliusinferable

Cosmopolitanism grounds an equal regard for every rational being; but Marcus thinks this concern in circles, from kin to city to humankind, each carrying its own duties. He thus stands on the median position of concentric circles, neither pure impartialism nor avowed partiality.

Meditations, III, 11 · Meditations, VII, 13

Arguments and objections

ArgumentThe concentric circles — The equal worth of all at the foundation, priority to those close to us in action: partiality as the lived form of equality.

Picture yourself at the center of nested circles: yourself first, then those close to you, your friends, your fellow citizens, and all around them the whole of humanity.
We owe consideration to each, but we can effectively care only for those near us; a world in which each watches first over their own circle is also the one in which each has the best chance of being protected.
Partiality is then not a breach of equality, but its lived form: the moral task, the said, is to draw the circles gradually inward, extending to the distant the attention owed to the near.

Therefore One can therefore hold the equal worth of all at the foundation, and priority to those close to us in action: this is the graded of the concentric circles.

ObjectionWhen they collide — When principle and bond collide, your position must say which prevails.

A scholarship: impartial justice gives it to the most deserving stranger, your heart wants it for your niece.
There, the middle way must decide. If equality always prevails, you are in truth an impartialist, and your circles mere landmarks.
If the bond always prevails, you are in truth a partialist. The position of the circles seems to dissolve at the very place it was expected to hold: at the point of conflict.

Therefore At the moment of choice, the middle way should therefore tip to one side, and so reveal the camp it belonged to all along.

ObjectionNeither one nor the other — In wanting both, you risk holding neither equality nor the bond.

The position of the circles looks wise, but it may be merely unstable: either equality truly commands, and your partiality is only a tolerated weakness.
Or it is the bond that commands, and the "impartial foundation" is only a convenient dressing for your preference for your own.
In between, one leans now on one, now on the other, as it suits: which may be leaning on nothing at all.

Therefore The middle way might therefore be only a polite name for a hesitation between two theses that are, themselves, clear.