Moral demandingness

Montaigne distrusts the strained, heroic virtues that do violence to nature and often turn into hypocrisy or the cruelty of the righteous. He prefers an ordinary, accommodating goodness that "lets itself flow" with the common slope of men. The highest moral demand, in his eyes, is not to surpass oneself but to know oneself well and keep one's just measure: a morality of "living fitly" rather than of grand duties.

Essays, III, 13, "Of Experience" and II, 11

The moral demand is maximalist: to become a junzi 君子 (person of noble character) is a lifelong, never-finished task, in which one must master oneself relentlessly. The disciple Zengzi speaks of a heavy burden and a long road, for he carries ren 仁 (humaneness) until death. Morality does not rest content with a minimum of non-harm: it calls for a continuous perfecting of the person.

Analects, VIII, 7 (the burden is heavy and the road long, for he carries humaneness until death) · Analects, XII, 1 (to master oneself and return to the rites)

The demand is unrelenting: to stop discoursing on what the good man should be, and to be one, now, without delay or excuse. This call to an effort of every instant, in which each act engages the whole of virtue, is a moral maximalism, tempered only by the limit of what is up to us.

Meditations, V, 1 · Meditations, X, 16 · Meditations, XII, 1

The ideal of the sage is so lofty as to be almost unattainable: it demands an effort of every instant, a never-slackening progress (prokopê) toward moral perfection. Seneca, aware of his own shortcomings, nonetheless upholds a maximalist demand for a thorough transformation of the self.

Letters to Lucilius, V and LXXV (unceasing moral progress) · On the Happy Life, XVII-XVIII (Seneca admits he is no sage)

Requiring one always to act so as to produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number, counting each equally, lays on the agent a potentially very heavy demand: no private sphere escapes evaluation by utility in principle. This maximalist demand collides, however, with the legislator's realism, which knows it cannot regulate everything: the principle itself sets no a priori limit, whereas its implementation necessarily presupposes one.

An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. I-IV (the greatest happiness principle applied to every action)

The moral demand is high: always act from duty and not from mere conformity, subjecting all one's maxims to the universal law. Kant tempers this by distinguishing perfect duties, strict and without exception, from imperfect duties such as beneficence or the cultivation of one's talents, which leave latitude to judgment, holding back from an extreme maximalism.

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, section II · Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Virtue

Maximising the general happiness exposes one to a potentially very heavy moral demand, since any action can be weighed against the greatest good. Yet Mill tempers this maximalism: everyday conduct is governed by tried secondary rules, and he does not expect from everyone the constant motive of the universal good, only that one do no harm and contribute on occasion.

Utilitarianism, ch. 2 (the secondary rules and the motive of actions)

His moral formula has two tiers: 'harm no one' (justice), a strict and fully enforceable duty, and 'help everyone as much as you can' (loving-kindness), which has no fixed bound and overflows mere obligation. The core of obligation is negative, but true charity is without measure, which keeps him from the minimalist camp.

On the Basis of Morality, §17

Impartial maximization of well-being tends toward a highly demanding morality: Singer argues we ought to give up to the point where further sacrifice would cost something of comparable moral importance, which can absorb almost all of our surplus. On this point the movement remains divided, with Mill restricting moral and legal interference to harms done to others.

Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality · Mill, On Liberty