Relation to others· Bondsdifficulty
Forgiveness
Should forgiveness be unconditional, or does it depend on the wrongdoer's repentance?
Forgiving without condition can free the victim, but seems to wipe away the wrong and ask nothing of the offender; reserving it for repentance preserves justice, but chains the one who suffered to the other's remorse. To take a position is to say whether forgiveness is a gift one grants oneself or a debt the guilty must first redeem.
Unconditionalism
4True forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable: if it requires apologies, reparation, or repentance, it is merely a transaction. Genuine forgiveness is a free, unconditional gift that exceeds any logic of desert.
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Senecainferable
Clemency, the prince's master virtue, disposes one to gentleness in setting penalties and to indulgence toward another's fault, from greatness of soul rather than from the offender's desert. This inclination to excuse and to understand human failings leans toward an unconditional remission, grounded in the magnanimity of the .
On Clemency, II, 3-7 (clemency, the soul's inclination to gentleness) · On Anger, II, 28-34 (being indulgent, for we all err)
Descartesinferable
From follows a readiness to excuse rather than to despise: the generous, Descartes writes, can hold no one in contempt, and being inclined to excuse the faults of others, they believe that whoever commits them does so rather through lack of knowledge than through lack of goodwill. Must forgiveness be made to depend on the wrongdoer's repentance? This principled leniency, prior to any reparation, leans toward a clemency close to the unconditional.
The Passions of the Soul, arts. 154 and 187
Marcus Aureliusinferable
The wrongdoer acts in ignorance: one cannot resent him as a free culprit, but should instruct him, or bear with him and let it pass. This inclination to excuse, grounded in the involuntary fault, leans toward a generous remission, without reaching a doctrine of unconditional forgiveness.
Meditations, II, 1 · Meditations, IX, 42 · Meditations, XI, 18
Michel de Montaigneinferable
What revolts Montaigne most is cruelty, "the extreme of all the vices". From this horror springs a clemency: vengeance and ferocious punishment repel him, and he praises the gentleness, the magnanimity that disarms an enemy rather than crushing him. Without theorizing an unconditional forgiveness, his leaning carries him to excuse rather than to punish, to understand the common human weakness rather than to demand requital.
Essays, II, 11, "Of Cruelty" and I, 1, "By Diverse Means We Arrive at the Same End"
Conditionalism
2Forgiveness presupposes that the wrongdoer acknowledges and regrets their fault: forgiving someone who asks for nothing betrays the victims and trivializes the wrong. Some crimes, met with no repentance, remain unforgivable.
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Benthamextrapolated
Since all punishment is an evil justified only by its utility, inflicting suffering with no net benefit is groundless; Bentham accordingly lists the cases where punishment is unmeet, notably where it would be inefficacious or unprofitable. One may infer that excusing or remitting a penalty obeys the same conditions of utility, tying any pardon or leniency to a conditional examination, though Bentham does not treat forgiveness as such explicitly.
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. XIII (cases unmeet for punishment)
Schopenhauerinferable
Since character is innate and unchanging, whoever has wronged you once carries within him the power to do it again: to forget would be imprudent. The forgiveness that erases hard-won experience squanders a dearly bought knowledge of men; one may cease to bear a grudge without erasing what the offence revealed of the character.
Parerga and Paralipomena, 'Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life'
See the problem map in the Atlas →
- PrescriptiveMoral QuestionIs there anything unforgivable?
Are some wrongs, some crimes too great ever to be forgiven, or is nothing in principle beyond forgiveness?
the wrong - PrescriptiveMoral Thought experimentForgiving in the victims' place?
Does one have the right to forgive a wrong done to another, or can only the victim forgive, so that forgiving in their name would be a usurpation?
forgiveness
Sub-problems to deepen this axis's discussion
- PrescriptiveMoralThe person and the deed
Is forgiving to distinguish the wrongdoer from their wrong, in order to receive them beyond what they did, or is it to excuse the deed itself and betray those who suffered from it?
the wrongdoer - PrescriptiveMoralForgiving oneself?
Can one, and should one, forgive oneself, or is it merely a way of excusing oneself and escaping the guilt one deserves?
oneself - PrescriptiveMoralForgiving, excusing, forgetting
Forgiveness differs from excusing, forgetting, or condoning: does any of it remain once we have stripped away everything that is merely an erasing of the wrong?
forgiveness - PrescriptiveMoralUndoing the irreparable
What is done cannot be undone: is forgiveness the only power that releases us from the irreversible, freeing us from the weight of what took place?
the irreversible
Related problems to broaden toward other axes
- PrescriptiveMoralJustice or mercy
Is forgiving to give up on justice and leave the wrong unpunished, or do justice and forgiveness aim at two different things that can coexist?
the deserved punishment - PrescriptivePolitical & legalThe forgiveness of peoples
Can a nation forgive, through amnesty or reconciliation, the crimes committed within it, or does forgiveness make sense only between the persons who lived through the wrong?
the community - PrescriptiveMoralA duty, or something more?
Is forgiveness owed, as an obligation toward the one who repents, or is it a free gift, beyond duty, that can be demanded of no one?
forgiveness - PrescriptiveMoralSaints and heroes
The heroic act is admired, never required: there would be a realm beyond duty. But if all the good we can do is owed, are these acts that exceed duty anything but duties we excuse ourselves from?
saints and heroesMoral demandingness - PrescriptiveMoralCan we give up resentment?
Would a world cured of resentment be gentler or less human? To give up holding things against people, is that an attainable wisdom, or the end of person-to-person relations?
resentmentMoral responsibility - PrescriptivePolitical & legalJustice or mercy
Must the deserved penalty always be inflicted, or can clemency, pardon, and forgiveness legitimately set it aside without betraying justice?
the deserved punishmentThe meaning of punishment
To forgive and forget is to throw out of the window precious experience that one has dearly bought.Schopenhauer · Parerga and Paralipomena, 'Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life'