The questions

Relation to others· Bondsdifficulty

Sincerity

Is it sometimes permissible to lie for someone else's good?

Must we always tell the truth, whatever the cost, or may we lie to spare or protect someone? Absolute candour can wound or betray; allowing the well-meant lie opens a door anyone can walk through for their own reasons. To take a position is to say whether respecting someone means owing them the truth, or sometimes sparing them from it.

TruthfulrigorismBenevolentlying permitted
The poles, and who holds them

Truthful rigorism

12

The duty to tell the truth is unconditional: lying, even out of kindness, destroys the trust that makes all speech possible and treats the other person as someone to be manipulated. No good intention can turn a lie into a right action.

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Associated figures: Kant
Who stands here
Diogenes of Sinopeexplicit

If social shame is only , to keep it quiet is to become complicit in the collective lie on which conventions rest. Hence two bound demands. (frank speech) requires telling the truth without circumlocution or flattery, even to the faces of the powerful: asked what is the finest thing among men, Diogenes answered, frank speech. (deliberate shamelessness) is its proof by deed: to perform in public, without blushing, what accepted modesty forbids is to demonstrate experimentally that this modesty had no natural ground. Cynic frankness is thus no gratuitous coarseness but a method of refutation that takes the body and the scandal as its arguments.

Diogenes Laertius, Lives, VI, 69

Cynicismexplicit

If social shame is only nomos, then to keep it quiet or humour it is to become complicit in the collective lie on which conventions rest. Hence two bound demands. (frank speech) requires telling the truth without circumlocution or flattery, even to the faces of the powerful, for whom deference has become an entitlement: it is, Diogenes answered, the finest thing men possess. Anaideia (deliberate shamelessness) is its proof by deed: to perform in public, without blushing, what accepted modesty forbids is to demonstrate experimentally that this modesty had no natural ground. Cynic frankness is thus no gratuitous coarseness but a method of refutation, which takes the body and the scandal as its arguments.

Diogenes Laertius, Lives, VI, 69

Kantexplicit

Against , Kant maintains that truthfulness is an unconditional duty, even toward the murderer asking where one's friend is hiding: lying would destroy the foundation of all right. This is the textbook case of truth-telling rigorism.

On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy

Meursaultexplicit

When Marie asks whether he loves her, Meursault simply answers that he probably does not, rather than saying what she hopes to hear; he plays no grief at his mother's funeral and admits he would rather not have seen her dead. He can no more cheat to save himself than to please: to say what he feels, and nothing else, is for him a necessity stronger than his own interest.

Part I, chapter 4: to Marie asking whether he loves her, he answers that it means nothing, but probably not · Part I, chapters 1-2: the absence of any feigned grief at his mother's funeral

Beauvoirexplicit

Beauvoir takes up the existentialist critique of : lying to oneself to flee one's freedom and responsibility. consists in lucidly assuming the ambiguity of the human condition, without taking refuge in a fixed role, in the seriousness of ready-made values, or in the image one presents to others. Truthfulness toward oneself is a strong moral requirement.

The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947), figures of evasion (the serious man, the sub-man)

Sartreexplicit

poses a puzzle: to lie one must know the truth one hides, yet here deceiver and deceived are one and the same. Sartre resolves it through the non-coincidence of the for-itself: not being a thing, I can flee myself by playing at being one, like the café waiter who makes himself wholly a « café waiter ». To fail in this way is to refuse one's own freedom.

Being and Nothingness, Part 1, ch. 2 (bad faith, the café waiter)

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Confuciusexplicit

The argument starts from a function of language: a name ("father", "ruler", "friend") does not merely label, it prescribes a duty bound to the role. A word misused, or belied by deeds, therefore unsettles the very order it was meant to uphold, and zhengming (the rectification of names) becomes the condition of a working society. Truthfulness ceases to be a private matter of conscience: trustworthiness of speech (xin) and sincerity (cheng) are demanded because lying and the gap between word and deed dissolve the social fabric. Hence a rigorism of truthfulness, in which the junzi 君子 (person of noble character) is ashamed when his words outrun his deeds.

Analects, XIII, 3 (the rectification of names) · Analects, XIV, 27 (the junzi is ashamed when his words exceed his deeds)

Epictetusinferable

The one making progress must be of unfailing integrity, matching deeds to judgments and not adorning oneself with what one is not. This demand for inner consistency leans clearly toward a rigorism of truthfulness.

Enchiridion, §46 · Enchiridion, §48

Antigoneexplicit

Antigone refuses all concealment: she orders Ismene to proclaim her deed to the whole city rather than keep it silent, performs the second rite in broad daylight, and confesses without evasion before Creon. The prudent lie, even a protective one, is hateful to her.

Prologue: she demands that Ismene shout the deed to all instead of hiding it · First and second episodes: caught in the act in daylight, she confesses at once

Michel de Montaigneexplicit

Lying is for Montaigne the vice he most detests: "we are men, and hold together, only by our word", and whoever lies betrays the social bond at its heart. The whole enterprise of the is itself a wager of frankness, to show himself "wholly and entirely naked", without disguise. This demand for truthfulness remains, however, that of a tolerant sage, not of an inflexible rigorism: it aims at good faith more than at the avowal of every truth in every circumstance.

Essays, I, 9, "Of Liars" and II, 18, "Of Giving the Lie"

Lockeinferable

Locke's toleration rests on the idea that sincere cannot be coerced: inner assent must follow conviction, never dissimulation or forced profession. This demand for inner truthfulness, joined to his evidentialist rule, inclines him toward a rigorism of sincerity, though he does not thematize a casuistry of lying as such.

A Letter Concerning Toleration (forced faith is no faith)

Millinferable

Truthfulness ranks among the rules of highest utility, for mutual trust is the foundation of social well-being, and to weaken it harms all. Mill thus holds lying to be gravely harmful; but, utility remaining the ultimate criterion, he admits rare recognised exceptions, which keeps him clearly, without absolutism, on the side of truthful rigorism.

Utilitarianism, ch. 2 (veracity, a rule of transcendent utility, and its exceptions)

Arguments and objections (3)
ArgumentThe argument from trustLying exploits the trust that grounds all speech; allow one exception, and the presumption of sincerity crumbles. See the page
ObjectionHonesty without regardA truth that spares no one is not a virtue, but a hardness. See the page
ObjectionThe arbitrary lineBetween lying and letting someone believe, the line you draw is less clear than it seems. See the page

Benevolent lying permitted

2

Telling the truth is a duty, but only toward those who have a right to it. When honesty would cause unjust harm, protecting an innocent person or sparing needless suffering can justify a lie: the truth is not owed to the executioner.

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Associated figures: Constant
Who stands here
Machiavelliexplicit

Since men are wicked and will not keep faith with you, you are not bound to keep yours when it harms you and the reasons that made you promise are spent. The prince must fight as a man by the laws and as a beast by force, and among beasts be a fox to scent snares as much as a lion to frighten off wolves. What then remains is the essential thing: not what he is but what he seems, for few touch the truth while the many stop at appearances.

The Prince, ch. XVIII (in what mode faith should be kept by princes)

Odysseusexplicit

Odysseus is the epic's great liar, and the poem does not blame him for it: he forges "Cretan tales" in which he gives himself a false identity, disguises himself as a beggar to get home, deceives the Cyclops as he does his hosts. When unmasks him, she does not reproach him but smiles and loves him for this virtuosity of , guile: the goddess shares his taste for the skilled lie. His speech serves the end he pursues more than it tells the truth; yet this cunning has its counterpart, when pride betrays him and, naming himself in triumph, he taunts the Cyclops at the risk of losing everything.

Odyssey, XIII, 256-286; XIV, 191-359; XIX (the Cretan tales) · Odyssey, XIII, 287-302 (Athena admires and praises his cunning)

Arguments and objections (3)
ArgumentThe right to the truthTelling the truth is a duty toward others; no one has a right to a truth they would use to harm. See the page
ObjectionThe lie that infantilizesLying "for the good" of another is deciding in their place what they can bear. See the page
ObjectionThe lie comes backThe benevolent lie destroys, in the end, what it claims to protect. See the page
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Going further

Related problems to broaden toward other axes

  • PrescriptiveMoral
    Illusion for another's sake

    Withholding a diagnosis, embellishing a situation: deciding that someone will live better without a truth means judging in their place what it is worth to them; who has that right?

    the truth owed to anotherThe value of truth

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Quotations
Everyone sees what you appear to be, but few perceive what you are.
Machiavelli · The Prince, ch. XVIII

See in the quotations

One must therefore be a fox to recognize snares, and a lion to frighten off the wolves.
Machiavelli · The Prince, ch. XVIII

See in the quotations

If names are not correct, language is not in accord with the truth of things; then affairs cannot succeed.
Confucius · Analects, XIII, 3

See in the quotations