← Back to the axis

Relation to others· Morals

Biocentrism

Axis: Moral circleTo whom do we owe moral consideration?

Every living being, sentient or not, has a worth of its own: plants, insects, and micro-organisms included. Ethics rests on reverence for life as such, each organism pursuing its own good in its own way.

Arguments and objections
ArgumentReverence for lifeEvery organism, sentient or not, pursues its own good; and having a good of one's own does not require feeling it. What has a good of its own has a worth that is not merely instrumental: the moral circle thus extends to all life.
  1. Every organism, plant, insect, or microbe, is oriented toward its own good: it grows, feeds, defends itself, reproduces, as though its life were an end for it.
  2. Having a good of one's own is not feeling it: the plant senses nothing, yet there are things good or harmful for it, a fulfillment that is its own.
  3. Now what has a good of its own has a worth that is not merely our use-value: to reduce it to a means is to scorn the end it is for itself.

Therefore So the moral circle extends to all life: not that all lives are worth the same in every circumstance, but that none is mere material, and that destroying a life always calls for a reason.

See the page
ObjectionAttacks the positionA good, but for whom?Biocentrism grants worth to all that pursues its good. But 'pursuing a good' may be only a metaphor, like the clock that 'wants' to tell the time: a genuine interest requires a subject able to feel its fate, failing which respect has no addressee.
  1. Biocentrism grants a worth of its own to all that pursues its good, sentient or not.
  2. But 'pursuing a good' is said in two senses: a clock 'wants' to tell the time, a virus 'wants' to replicate, without anything mattering to anyone. A genuine interest presupposes a subject to whom its fate can make a difference.
  3. Without sentience, there is no point of view from which living or dying is good or bad for the organism: one can destroy it, one does not wrong it; 'respect' has no addressee.

Therefore So moral worth requires a being able to feel its good: below sentience there are admirable mechanisms, not subjects toward whom we would have duties.

See the page
Problems
  • PrescriptiveMoral
    Reverence for life

    To count, must one be capable of suffering, or is it enough to be alive? A tree, an insect pursue a good of their own: do they deserve our respect on that ground, or does life without sentience oblige us to nothing?

    a plant, an insect