Is the moral standpoint impartial?
On the axis: Criterion of right action · the moral standpoint
Is judging morally a matter of rising to principles that hold for everyone regardless of persons, or is concrete attentiveness to those close to us the very heart of morality?
Justification
Nothing is good without qualification except a good will: neither talents nor happiness, which can serve evil. If moral worth lies neither in the object willed nor in the consequences, it can lie only in the form of the maxim, its fitness to hold as a law for all. From this the is derived: act only on a maxim I can will to be universal. This is a deontology that refuses, against , to measure duty by outcome; the reintroduces the virtues, but as derived from duty, hence a small residual weight on that pole.
Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, section II
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, sections I and II · Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Virtue
Justification
A maxim has moral worth only if I can will it to become a universal law holding for every rational being, with no exception in my favour or for those close to me. The excludes by construction any privilege granted to oneself or one's own, hence an almost pure impartialism.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, section II
Anchors: Kant · Gilligan · Noddings
leads to: Partiality