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From desired to desirable

That we all seek pleasure does not entail that it is the good: it remains to be seen whether what nature makes us want is what is worth wanting.

Objects to Hedonism

Hume, Moore · A Treatise of Human Nature, III.i.1

1. The cradle argument moves from fact to worth: because every creature spontaneously pursues pleasure, pleasure is supposed to be the good.
2. But between 'this is what we desire' and 'this is desirable, worth desiring' lies a step that nothing crosses on its own: a child also seeks what flatters it and flees what shapes it, yet we make no rule of the good out of that.
3. Nature inclines us; it does not judge for us: from a spontaneous leaning one cannot infer that it leads to the best. One would have to show, in addition, that pleasure is worth something, not merely that it attracts, and that proof the cradle does not give.

Therefore So the argument proves too little: it establishes that pleasure is a good we seek, not that it is the highest good; the step from desired to desirable is still to be made.