Epicurus's riddle
On the axis: The problem of evil · evil and the attributes of God
Can God prevent evil but not want to, or want to but not be able? One of the three, his power, his goodness, or the reality of evil, must give way: which one?
An old dilemma is ascribed to , reported by Lactantius and recalled by : either God wants to abolish evil but cannot, or he can but will not, or he neither can nor wants to, or he both can and wants to. Powerless, he is not all-powerful; unwilling, he is not good; neither, why call him God? And if he both can and wants to, then where does evil come from?
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Justification
The so-called Epicurean dilemma, transmitted by Lactantius, concludes that a God at once good and all-powerful is incompatible with the existence of evil: either he wishes to prevent it and cannot, or he can and will not. For Epicurus, the blessed gods do not meddle with the world.
Lactantius, On the Anger of God, 13 (attributed dilemma); Letter to Menoeceus
Justification
In the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Philo revives Epicurus's old questions: faced with the world's mass of suffering, divine goodness and omnipotence cannot be inferred from nature. Evil is the reef on which natural theology runs aground.
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, X-XI