Narrativism

The self is no fixed substance hidden behind existence: it is a task, something made through one's choices, whose unity is only the narrative unity of the project that takes it up. For Kierkegaard the self is a relation that relates to itself and must be won; for Sartre the for-itself has no given essence. Hence a conception of the self as constructed, close to narrativism.

Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death · Being and Nothingness

All consciousness is consciousness of something: it is therefore no substance, no thing-self lodged within it, but a presence to itself separated from itself by a nothingness. It is this gap, not an ego (against Descartes and Husserl), that makes the for-itself never what it is and is what it is not: the condition of its freedom and its temporality.

Being and Nothingness, Part 1, ch. 1 (the for-itself is not what it is) · Being and Nothingness, Part 2 (the transcendent ego; cf. The Transcendence of the Ego)

The self is neither a substance nor a fixed essence: it is what it makes of itself through its choices and its history. In The Second Sex as in her Memoirs, the subject appears as a becoming constituted by a life-narrative, a series of projects taken up and reinterpreted, with no core given once and for all, hence a clear narrativist dominance.

The Second Sex (1949), becoming-woman · Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter (1958)

Montaigne finds in himself no fixed substance. The self is "the sway", a flux of moods, opinions and states contradictory from one instant to the next, closer to a shifting bundle than to a stable soul. What nonetheless holds it together is no essence but, it seems, the continued writing of the Essays, which recaptures this passing in a self-portrait never closed: hence a narrative strand that tempers the sheer patchwork of the parts. For him the self is not given, it is composed in the very telling.

Essays, III, 2, "Of Repentance" and II, 1, "Of the Inconsistency of Our Actions"