Relation to others· Society and history
Holism
Axis: Individual and society — To understand social life, should we start from individuals or from the social whole?
The social whole is more than the sum of its parts: it has laws of its own and exerts an influence on individuals that exceeds them. Our ways of thinking, feeling, and acting are shaped first by the society that precedes us.
Movements 3
Marxismexplicit
To start from the individual in order to explain society is to take for a starting point what is in fact a result: the "isolated, self-sufficient" individual of liberalism and the social contract is itself a late product of a given society, not its cause. Marx reverses the order of explanation: the human is understood from class and place in the relations of production, for the human essence has no seat in the individual but in the ensemble of social relations. This holism is not a collectivist preference but a thesis of method, aimed against the abstract individualism of political economy and natural right.
Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, VI (1845) · Marx, Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy (Grundrisse, 1857)
Aristotelianismexplicit
The city is prior in nature to the individual, as the whole is to the part: in isolation the individual is not self-sufficient and cannot actualize a properly human end. This priority of the whole leans holist, without dissolving the individual, since the end remains the flourishing of citizens.
Aristotle, Politics, I, 2
Show inferred positions (1)
Confucianisminferable
The Confucian person exists fully only as caught within the web of his relations: the self is constituted by its roles and duties toward others, not as an autonomous atom prior to society. Personal accomplishment and the order of the social whole are bound together: to cultivate oneself is already to work for the harmony of family, state, and world.
The Great Learning (Daxue) · Confucius, Analects (Lunyu), 6.30
Philosophers 11
Hegelexplicit
Society is not a sum of individuals that would preexist it: it is the ethical whole, , which has priority over them, not chronological but conceptual, and in which alone they attain their substantial freedom. Family, civil society and state are the moments of a that particularizes itself in its members and lives in them. The abstract individual, prior to any community, is a fiction.
Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §142-157 (ethical life) · Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §257-258 (the state)
Marxexplicit
For Marx the isolated individual of the classical economists is a fiction: men are intelligible only through the social relations and classes to which they belong. Consciousness, needs, even ideas are determined by social being: a strongly stance, in which the social whole has primacy over the individual considered apart.
Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859) · Grundrisse, introduction (critique of the isolated Robinson Crusoe individual)
Aristotleexplicit
For Aristotle the criterion of priority is not chronological but functional: prior is that without which the rest cannot fulfil its function. Now a hand severed from the body is a hand only in name, since it can no longer grasp; likewise the individual outside the city cannot fulfil its nature and remains an unfinished human. The city is therefore by nature prior to the individual as the whole to the part, an avowed holism that does not, for all that, erase the city's end, the living-well of its citizens.
Politics, I.2 (1253a)
Platoexplicit
The examines justice first in the city, "writ large", in order then to read it in the soul: the political whole is prior and illuminates the individual part. The city is an organism in which each class is a member, and the common good takes precedence over private interest, to the point of abolishing property and family among the guardians.
Republic, II, 368c-369a · Republic, V, 462a-466d
Marcus Aureliusexplicit
Rational beings are the limbs of one body, not mere parts set side by side: the individual is fulfilled only in working for the whole, and the antisocial act cuts itself off from nature. A holist view, in which the common good is no constraint but the completion of the individual's nature.
Meditations, VII, 13 · Meditations, II, 1 · Meditations, IX, 23
Rousseauexplicit
The pact does not juxtapose individuals: it transforms them into a moral and collective body, a « common self » endowed with a will of its own. The citizen draws his being and his liberty from this whole, to which he alienates himself entirely. Against the individualism of the Enlightenment, Rousseau leans holist, without dissolving the individual, since the end remains his liberty.
Rousseau, The Social Contract, I, 6
Show inferred positions (5)
Confuciusinferable
A person is intelligible only through their roles and relations: one is a son, a brother, a subject, a friend, and it is by fulfilling these relations according to the li 禮 (rites) that one becomes fully human. Identity is relational, not monadic: the leaning is markedly holist, even if self-cultivation keeps an irreducibly personal demand.
Analects, XII, 11 (each defined by his relation) · Analects, II, 5-8 (the relational duties of filial piety)
Machiavelliinferable
The city is for Machiavelli not a sum of individuals but a body run through with collective forces, the two humors of the people and the great, whose clash produces laws and liberty. The salvation of this body, the fatherland, takes precedence over individual conscience, the prince's as much as the citizen's.
Discourses on Livy, I.4 · The Prince, ch. IX
Senecainferable
Man is born for community and mutual aid: we are the limbs of one great body, and the individual good is fulfilled in service to the human whole. Without dissolving the individual into the city, Seneca subordinates philosophical retreat to a duty of common usefulness, leaning toward a holist view of society.
Letters to Lucilius, XCV (the limbs of one body) · On Leisure, III-VI (the sage must serve the great commonwealth)
Beauvoirinferable
The free individual remains the source of meaning and values, yet does not exist outside a web of relations: he is constituted in the gaze of others, in institutions and historical conditions that situate him. Beauvoir holds together the irreducibility of singular freedom and a concrete dependence on the collective, hence a position only slightly inclined toward the relational pole.
The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947), freedom and the common world · The Second Sex (1949), woman situated within social relations
Sartreinferable
The early Sartre starts from the individual freedom of consciousness, irreducible, which anchors his thought firmly on the side of the individual. But the later Sartre, of the Critique of Dialectical Reason, articulates this freedom with matter and history: the individual makes himself within collective wholes (the group-in-fusion, the practico-inert) that condition him in return. The position thus hovers near a balance, shifted slightly toward the collective by this evolution.
Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960), the group-in-fusion and the practico-inert