Relation to truth· Belief and knowledgedifficulty
Ethics of belief
Can we legitimately believe without sufficient evidence?
To believe commits us: the shipowner who talked himself into trusting, without proof, that his vessel would hold answers for the wreck, for he had no right to believe it. Must we then proportion every belief to the evidence, or are there cases, friendship, commitment, faith, where refusing to believe for want of a guarantee would itself be a fault? To take a position is to say what we owe to evidence when we form our beliefs, and what we are accountable for in holding them.
Evidentialism
7It is wrong, always and for anyone, to believe anything on insufficient evidence. Believing carelessly is not merely an intellectual mistake but a moral failing that erodes our shared trust.
Explore this position →Humeexplicit
Since every factual belief rests on experience, its firmness should be measured by the evidence: to believe beyond what the evidence warrants is an epistemic fault. Hume turns this into a weapon against miracles: a miracle is by definition a violation of the laws of nature, and those laws are established by uniform experience, hence by the fullest proof there is. The weight of contrary experience is therefore maximal; no testimony can overcome it, unless its falsehood would be more miraculous still than the reported fact, which never occurs. The argument does not deny the supernatural a priori: it shows that a mind ruled by evidence cannot assent to it.
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, sect. X (of miracles)
Lockeexplicit
Since our knowledge of matters of fact stays bounded to the probable, the right use of the understanding is not to believe firmly but to measure assent to evidence: the firmness of belief must exactly track the weight of the grounds. Hence a properly evidentialist norm, on which to believe beyond what the proofs warrant becomes a fault, not against prudence, but against reason itself. Locke makes of it the weapon aimed at enthusiasm, the claim to an inner light that dispenses with proof, and grounds on it his demand for toleration: an unexamined conviction entitles no one to impose it on others.
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, IV, ch. 16 (the degrees of assent) and ch. 19 (enthusiasm)
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Rationalisminferable
The norm of assent is evidence: one should affirm only what the understanding perceives clearly and distinctly. Descartes makes error a fault of the will judging beyond what the understanding clearly conceives, and prescribes withholding assent outside of evidence. For Spinoza it is the that carries a necessary and true affirmation. Assent is thus regulated by the clarity of the idea, not by a will to believe.
Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, IV · Spinoza, Ethics, II, proposition 49
Skepticisminferable
To grant assent to a thesis about the non-evident nature of things is to hold true what one cannot prove: the skeptic sees this as a fault and abstains on principle. But an objection looms: would a life without any belief even be livable? He answers by distinguishing two assents. To the that force themselves upon him (that it is day, that he is hungry) he yields without resisting, for they are not up for dispute; what he refuses is the further assent that would add "and so it truly is, by nature." He therefore acts, guided by phenomena and customs, while never positing a dogma.
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 13-24
Pyrrhoinferable
Pyrrho's first move is to withdraw his assent from every opinion: while things remain indeterminate, to grant belief to one rather than another would be to rush. This restraint meets the evidentialist spirit, to believe only in proportion to what shows itself, but in an extreme form, since nothing shows itself enough to deserve belief. The Pyrrhonian nuance is that he makes of this restraint no moral duty: it is the lived effect of the indeterminacy of things, the impossibility of assenting where nothing tips the scale, rather than a rule one would impose on oneself.
Aristocles (after Timon), cited by Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, XIV, 18 · Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers, IX, 61-62
Empiricismexplicit
The school makes the regulation of assent an epistemic duty: Locke holds that one should give one's assent in proportion to the evidence and the degrees of probability, and Hume sums up this ethics of belief in his famous maxim about the wise man who proportions his belief to the evidence. To ground knowledge in experience is to require believing only to the measure of what experience attests.
Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, IV, 15-16 (of probability and the degrees of assent) · Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section X (of miracles)
Sextus Empiricusinferable
The skeptic's first move is to withhold from whatever is not self-evident: while the reasons remain balanced, to grant belief would be rash. This restraint meets the evidentialist spirit, to believe in proportion to the reasons. The Pyrrhonian nuance is that he suspends even where the dogmatist believes he has proofs, and that he makes of this restraint not a moral duty but the lived effect of the balance of arguments: not a duty to believe only the proven, but the impossibility of assenting when nothing tips the scale.
Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 13 (assent) · Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 19-20
Non-evidentialism
0When the evidence is inconclusive and the stakes are vital, we have the right, sometimes even the duty, to believe beyond what the evidence guarantees. Some truths reveal themselves only to those who first dare to wager on them.
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Related problems to broaden toward other axes
- Descriptive SituationSure of yourself, sure of the truth?
Should a conviction asserted with aplomb but no proof carry the day, or must we demand reasons before believing, even at the discomfort of suspending judgment?
a claimRelation to certainty - PrescriptiveEpistemicHave we the right to believe?
Beyond what makes a belief justified, is it permissible to believe without sufficient evidence, or is it a fault, toward oneself as toward others? The question of warrant extends into that of the duty of belief.
the act of believingJustification of belief - Practical Thought experimentThe wager of belief
Even without proof, is it not in our interest to believe, since we would have everything to gain if God exists and little to lose otherwise? But can one decide to believe by calculation?
to believeExistence of God - PrescriptiveEpistemicDoes belief require proof?
May one believe only on the strength of proof, or is faith a legitimate venture that need not justify itself before the tribunal of evidence?
to believeExistence of God - DescriptiveLying to oneself
Choosing one's illusions would require believing at will; but can we really believe what we know to be false, or only arrange things so as not to look?
one's own beliefsThe value of truth
The mind, if it will proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds of probability ... and upon a due balancing the whole, reject or receive it, with a more or less firm assent, proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability.Locke · Essay Concerning Human Understanding, IV, ch. 15-16 (probability and the degrees of assent)
A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.Hume · Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, sect. X